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 It’s evening in a U.S. law firm office, and the boss has called in an em-
ployee to help him locate a file on his computer.  She sits at his desk and 
finds the file and tells him that she will organize his computer files the next 
day.  As she stands to leave, he offers to drive her home.  She politely de-
clines.  He then asks how she’s doing, it seems she recently started working 
there.  When he compliments her on her work, she thanks him.  Suddenly, 
he comments on her earrings, stating, “these are cool,” as he quickly moves 
closer, putting his hands on each side of her head and begins kissing her on 
the mouth.  She pulls away.  Several awkward seconds go by, while he con-
tinues to hold her hands, before she says, “Um, I have a boyfriend.”  He 
replies, “That’s cool.  I’m married.”  He then says, “Ok.  You’re not into 
that,” and moves between her and the door to his office.  He says, “I just 
wanted to show you how much I appreciate you.  Everything is ok, right?  
Nothing happened!  We’re good here, right?”  He then puts his arms out to 
gesture for a hug, repeating, “We’re good here.”  She nods, keeps her elbows 
bent and arms close to her chest as he hugs her and kisses her on her cheek.  
She then leaves his office. 
This Public Service Announcement tells us that the above scenario is 
based on an actual incident and ends with “#ThatsHarassment.”1  
In Italy, this boss could be prosecuted for the crime of sexual violence. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the many significant aspects of the #MeToo movement has been 
the similar patterns of sexual misconduct that hundreds of women, primarily, 
have experienced.  Much of the behavior reported is appalling and as such 
merits separate and thorough discussion.2  The focus of this Article is the 
sudden, forceful, and unwanted kiss.3  Many women reported descriptions of 
forced kisses by men in positions of authority or power as compared to the 
women subjected to these kisses.  For example, Rachel Crooks, who worked 
in Trump Tower, described how after she greeted Mr. Trump by offering a 
handshake, he kissed her on the mouth forcibly and without her consent.4  
 
 1. #ThatsHarassment PSA episode entitled, “The Boss,” AD COUNCIL, https://www.ad-
council.org/Our-Campaigns/Safety/Confronting-Sexual-Harassment (last visited Feb. 20, 
2019) (I’ve only summarized the portrayal in this video.  The full, nearly four-minute, video 
is worth watching despite how uncomfortable it makes the viewer).  I am grateful for the 
license granted by the Ad Council to show the full version of this PSA at the Women and the 
Law Symposium on March 8, 2019. 
 2. Riley Griffin, Hannah Recht & Jeff Green, #MeToo: One Year Later, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/. 
 3. See infra Part II for my explanation of the words sudden, forceful, and unwanted. 
 4. Megan Twohey & Michael Barbaro, Two Women Say Donald Trump Touched Them 
Inappropriately, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/poli-
tics/donald-trump-women.html; see also Clara Sinclair, Woman Who Accused Trump of 
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Indeed, Mr. Trump has bragged about not waiting to ask, but just kissing 
women.5  More recently, Nobel Laureate, Óscar Arias Sánchez, has been ac-
cused of pinning women to the wall and trying to kiss them.6  While a number 
of men have lost their jobs due, in part, to forced kisses, none have faced 
criminal prosecution for forced kisses in the United States.  By contrast, there 
have been criminal convictions of “sexual violence” for sudden, forceful 
kisses under Italian law.  
Eight years ago, two law professors, one Italian, Alberto Cadoppi, one 
U.S., Michael Vitiello, co-authored an article in which they considered a 
conviction in Italy for sexual violence based on forced kisses.7  They deter-
mined that there were no criminal cases involving adults and forced kisses 
in the U.S. and that it was unlikely there would be such a case, unless an 
underage victim was involved.8  Indeed, the authors “remain[ed] convinced 
that a kiss is just a kiss.”9  They further stated that while “a creative law 
professor might come up with a bizarre example of a person who dashes 
about kissing his victims, fully aware that his victims do not want him to kiss 
them. . . .  [T]raditional crimes like simple battery can provide sufficient pro-
tection.”10  
This Article calls for a reconsideration of whether such conduct 
amounts to sexual violence in light of the #MeToo reports of sudden kisses 
that have exposed the frequency with which this occurs and the harmful im-
pact on the victims.  This Article is part of a larger project studying how Italy 
 
Forcing Her to Kiss Him is Running for Office, BOINGBOING (Feb. 6, 2018), https://bo-
ingboing.net/2018/02/06/woman-who-accused-trump-of-for.html.  At least eighteen other 
women have accused Donald Trump of sexual misconduct.  See e.g., Eli Saslow & Carolyn 
Van Houten, Is Anyone Listening? WASH. POST. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/02/19/feature/trump-accuser-keeps-telling-her-story-
hoping-someone-will-finally-listen/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6d37d4483fc4 (describing 
Rachel Crooks as one of nineteen women who have accused President Trump of sexual as-
sault). 
 5. David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation 
About Women in 2005, WASH. POST. (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in2005/2016/10/07/ 
3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.c800d29c6e81. 
 6. Elisabeth Malkin & Frances Robles, The Hurdles Women Faced in Accusing a No-
bel Laureate of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/02/10/world/americas/oscar-arias-costa-rica-metoo.html. 
 7. Alberto Cadoppi & Michael Vitiello, A Kiss is Just a Kiss, or is it?: A Comparative 
Look at Italian and American Sex Crimes, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 191 (2010). 
 8. This project is primarily limited to situations involving adults since sexual violence 
against minors is treated separately and specifically in both the U.S. and Italy.  The differences 
under U.S. and Italian law regarding minors and sexual violence is worthy of a full project by 
itself. 
 9. Cadoppi & Vitiello, supra note 7, at 217. 
 10. Id. at 217 n.236.  This is the position Professor Cadoppi has taken in Italian language 
materials, as well.  ALBERTO CADOPPI, COMMENTARIO DELLE NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA 
SESSUALE E CONTRO LA PEDOFILIA 43 (4th ed. 2006).  Instead, the examples of Donald Trump 
and Óscar Arias Sánchez alone illustrate patterns of behavior by individual men.  The reports 
about Leslie Moonves, described in Part V also illustrate a pattern of behavior. 
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reformed its fascist-era rape laws to better protect the sexual autonomy of 
victims.  While application of the 1996 Italian law still has a way to go to 
fulfill this goal,11 it has certainly progressed significantly since the infamous 
“jeans case.”12  Certainly, the fact that a forced unwanted kiss might result 
in a conviction for sexual violence indicates that judges and lawyers in Italy 
have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the criminal relevance of 
sudden unwanted kisses.  Highlighting this work for audiences in the U.S. 
and applying a comparative law lens creates the distance that can be helpful 
for evaluating what we have previously taken for granted or not fully ques-
tioned.  My review of these types of cases in Italy and relevant Italian schol-
arship reveals a number of attitudes and assumptions that inform how we can 
think about these scenarios in the U.S.  This study challenges the conclusion 
of Professors Vitiello and Cadoppi that “a kiss is just a kiss.”  Unlike simple 
battery, a sudden, forced and unwanted kiss intrudes on the sexual autonomy 
of the victim in a way that is not trivial and therefore deserves specific anal-
ysis and protection.  
Part II of this Article considers what justifies an analysis of forced 
kisses and includes a review of the #MeToo reports of sudden, forced kisses 
to challenge the assumption that forced kisses are sufficiently infrequent as 
to not merit consideration as a sex crime.  This section also includes an ex-
planation of the terms “sudden, forced, and unwanted” in this context.  The 
number of these types of situations and the impact on the women compels us 
to rethink how criminal law in the U.S. might address this phenomenon.  Part 
II also considers what U.S. scholars, judges, and lawyers might learn from 
considering the relevant Italian experience on this topic.  
Part III describes the reforms effected by the 1996 Italian law on sexual 
violence relevant to the question of sudden, forced kisses and how the Corte 
di Cassazione (Italy’s Supreme Court for non-constitutional matters) has in-
terpreted the term “sexual acts” in the 1996 law to include sudden, forced 
kisses in a number of cases.  Italy reformed its rape law in 1996, so current 
law defines a person who has committed sexual violence as “whoever, by 
violence or threats or abuse of authority compels another to do or submit to 
 
 11. A recently released opinion by the Ancona Court of Appeal is an example of the 
persistence of rape myths.  According to news reports, the court overturned a conviction for 
rape finding that the victim was not credible.  The court commented on a photograph of the 
victim and agreed with the defense argument that the victim was “unattractive and too mas-
culine to be a credible rape victim.”  Cassazione annulled this decision and Italy’s Justice 
Ministry has ordered an inquiry into the ruling.  Italy Outraged as Court Finds Victim Too 
Ugly to Be Raped, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/apon-
line/2019/03/13/world/europe/ap-eu-italy-rape-verdict.html. 
 12. See, e.g., Rachel A. Van Cleave, Sex, Lies, and Honor in Italian Rape Law, 38 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 427 (2005) (discussing Cass. Pen., sez. III, 6 novembre 1998, Cristiano, 
Foro it., II 1999, CXXII, 163).  Indeed, the Corte di Cassazione subsequently made it clear 
that it is not a defense to the offense of sexual violence that the victim was wearing jeans and 
therefore must have consented.  Cass. Pen., sez. III, 26 novembre 2001, Akid, available at 
https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2006/07/03/violenza-sessuale-sulla-possibilita-di-
sfilare-il-jeans-indossato-dalla-vittima. 
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sexual acts shall be imprisoned from five to ten years.”13  Here, I explore in 
some detail aspects of the 1996 reform, including the harm to be protected 
by the sexual violence law.  One important goal of the reformed law is to 
focus on protecting the sexual autonomy of the victim, in contrast to the prior 
laws, which sought to protect honor, chastity, and public morals.  Reviewing 
a number of Cassazione decisions about forced kisses over the past twenty 
years, this Article highlights some shifts in the Court’s understanding of sex-
ual violence.  
There are three specific aspects of Cassazione’s analysis, in the context 
of sudden, forced kisses, that reform efforts in the U.S. should consider: (1) 
the Corte di Cassazione does not limit its interpretation of “sexual acts” to 
only touchings of intimate parts; (2) the Court does not require that the of-
fender have the specific intent of achieving his or her own sexual arousal or 
gratification; and (3) the court has found that the sudden nature of such kisses 
can satisfy the “violence” element of the Italian law.  While archaic rape 
myths still creep into how Italian prosecutors and judges address sexual vio-
lence,14 there is also evidence of progress that is worthy of consideration by 
U.S. scholars and lawyers.  
Part IV sets out examples of how laws, such as sexual battery in Cali-
fornia, a criminal law prohibiting “sexual contact” in Michigan, as well as 
the current draft of the Model Penal Code provision on “criminal sexual con-
tact” would likely address the situation of sudden, forced, and unwanted 
kisses.  This demonstrates important contrasts with how the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione has addressed these situations and recommends a reevaluation of 
laws like this in the U.S. to consider the three conclusions reached by the 
Italian Court set out above. 
Part V of this Article describes some of the incidents of sudden, un-
wanted kisses reported as part of #MeToo in the last year to demonstrate that 
these incidents are not so rare and trivial as to justify excluding them from 
sexual violence analysis.  These examples also underscore the harm sudden, 
forced, and unwanted kisses inflict on victims. 
II. WHY ANALYZE SUDDEN, FORCED KISSES UNDER ITALIAN LAW? 
With the numerous reports of more serious and violent sexual assault 
and sexual misconduct in the #MeToo era, why focus specifically on forced 
kisses?  As with any possible expansion of the criminal law, the potential to 
further increase criminal convictions and incarceration is an important 
 
 13. Codice penale [C.p.] 609-bis (It.) (emphasis added).  The last sentence of this pro-
vision allows for a reduction in the sentence for “cases of less seriousness.”  Id. 
 14. Jason Horowitz, Are You Too Old to Have Been Sexually Harassed? In Italy, Maybe, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/world/europe/italy-carlo-
tavecchio-sexual-harassment.html (describing a motion by the public prosecutor to dismiss 
charges of groping by Elisabetta Cortani, the president of the female division of the Lazio 
soccer club, against her boss, Carlos Tavecchio, when he was the head of Italian soccer, stat-
ing that since the complainant was 53, she could not have been intimidated by Tavecchio). 
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consideration.  Historically, in the United States, men of color have borne 
this burden at vastly disproportionate rates, particularly as to sex offenses.15  
Moreover, most U.S. jurisdictions impose additional consequences such as 
registration as a sex offender.16  Perhaps most significantly, such an expan-
sion raises the question of the extent to which the law, particularly criminal 
law, can or should drive social change.  I am mindful of these significant 
concerns.  I wholeheartedly support efforts to reform and rationalize criminal 
justice in the United States, including addressing excessively draconian pun-
ishments and overly expansive sex offender registration laws.  I also support 
efforts to rid the criminal justice system of explicit and implicit bias.  These 
efforts can and should continue.  At the same time, it is important to assess 
conduct that harms individual sexual autonomy and consider how best to 
address it. 
I remain convinced that exploring the impact and harm of sudden, 
forced kisses by assessing the Italian Corte di Cassazione’s opinions and the 
analyses of Italian scholars will help map out a richer understanding of sex-
ual violence in the United States.  
Many situations considered in this project would likely be analyzed as 
civil or disciplinary matters under U.S. sexual harassment law, which covers 
behavior in the workplace, or Title IX, which covers such conduct at educa-
tional institutions.  Nonetheless, this Article focuses on potential criminal 
liability of forced kisses for two reasons.  First, Italian criminal law does not 
include a provision for sexual harassment.  Indeed, up until very close to the 
time that the 1996 law was adopted, it included a provision for molestie ses-
suali, essentially sexual harassment, but ultimately, and perhaps unfortu-
nately, it was left on the cutting room floor.17  Second, the line between con-
duct that violates sexual harassment law and conduct that constitutes 
criminal sexual assault is not clearly delineated; sexually harassing conduct 
might also be considered sexual assault, even if criminal charges are never 
filed.  The purpose of this project is to prompt a fulsome discussion of this 
issue and to consider how Italian criminal law in this context can help to 
sharpen and deepen our analysis and understanding. 
The use of the phrase “a kiss is just a kiss”18 in the title of Professors 
Cadoppi and Vitiello’s article itself illustrates the importance of engaging in 
 
 15. I agree that this is a very real concern, but one that should be addressed by working 
to rid the criminal justice system of explicit and implicit bias, not by trivializing the impact 
of sexual violence.  See Ana Gruber, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less 
Punishment, 55 A. CRIM. L. REV. 259 (2018) (recognizing the importance of considering the 
type of sentence that should accompany any expansion of sexual assault laws). 
 16. This is another extremely valid point emphasized by Professors Cadoppi and Vi-
tiello.  Cadoppi & Vitiello, supra note 7, at 210-13. 
 17. CADOPPI, supra note 10. 
 18. From the song, As Time Goes By written by Herman Hupfeld in 1931 and performed 
by the character Sam in the movie Casablanca in which the lyrics speak of lovers.  The lyrics 
are reproduced at https://www.google.com/search?q=lyrics+to+as+time+goes+by&rlz= 
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this discussion.  Evoking the romance of the lovers portrayed by Humphrey 
Bogart and Ingrid Bergman in the movie Casablanca,19 the article’s title sug-
gests that this image of two lovers is similar to the situation of the assistant 
to the Chief of Police, who was subjected to her commander’s advances as 
he sought to kiss her on the mouth more than once and ended up kissing her 
neck.20  As described in more detail below, the facts of the Italian case con-
sidered by Professors Cadoppi and Vitiello are nothing like the romance be-
tween the characters in Casablanca.  Juxtaposing these two images helps set 
the contours of the debate and, in turn, can help us determine how the law 
might address such situations.  
Why we should consider Italian law is another legitimate question.  
Judges and lawyers in Italy have exhibited historically, and still today, ad-
herence to entrenched rape myths and stereotypes about women who claim 
to have been raped or sexually assaulted.21  As discussed below, before the 
1996 reform, sex crimes had been classified as crimes against public moral-
ity and decency.  Sexual violence is now classified as a crime against the 
person.  Initially, this was considered merely a symbolic change.  In two 
cases, in particular, one decided right before the 1996 law went into effect22 
and another shortly after,23 the Court’s opinions illustrate the significance of 
categorizing sexual violence as a crime against an individual and presents 
stark contrasts to each other.  This analysis can further sharpen understand-
ing in the U.S. about the interests to be protected by the criminal law. 
Another reason to consider Italian law in this respect is the fact that a 
provision, which would have established a lesser offense of molestie ses-
suale, essentially sexual harassment, was dropped from the law that ulti-
mately went into effect.  On the one hand, this has been described as a missed 
opportunity, especially given similar laws in France and Spain.24  On the 
other hand, the fact that the legislature considered but then dropped such a 
provision can help to inform how the Italian courts have decided to address 
sudden, forced kisses as a crime of sexual violence when victims are unlikely 
to have any other recourse. 
This Article uses the words “sudden, forced, and unwanted” to explain 
a number of aspects about the incidents described.  The word “sudden” 
 
1C5CHFA_enIT749US806&oq=lyrics+to+as+time+goes+by&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60j69
i61.17786j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 19. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942). 
 20. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 26 gennaio 2006, n. 19808. 
 21. I have discussed this in significant depth in the context of the infamous “jeans case.”  
See Van Cleave, supra note 12, at 427. 
 22. See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cass. Pen., sez. III, 
22 novembre 1995, n. 11318, Delogu, reprinted in 1997 RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN., 962 [here-
inafter Delogu case]. 
 23. See infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cass. Pen., sez. III, 
27 aprile 1998, Di Francia, reprinted in Foro it., 1998, II, p. 505. 
 24. Stefania Tabarelli de Fatis, Sulla rilevanza penale del “bacio” come atto di libidine 
prima e dopo la riforma dei reati sessuali 1997 RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 965, 980-81. 
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conveys that these incidents typically catch the victim by surprise given how 
quickly the offender acts.  The incidents described are also unexpected by 
the victim because there is not, nor has there been, any intimate relationship 
between the victim and the offender.  The incident described above and de-
picted in the #ThatsHarrassment public service announcement illustrates 
this, as does Rachel Crooks’ experience with Mr. Trump.  The term “forced” 
or forceful indicates that, in many instances, the offender has in some way 
restrained the victim.  However, even where the offender has not held the 
victim’s head, shoulders, hands, or arms, he has ambushed her in a way that 
is sudden as well as forceful.  In addition, while not all examples involve so-
called “profound” kisses, a strong argument that force is involved exists due 
to the sudden nature with which a kiss is thrusted upon the victim.  The sce-
narios described above also illustrate this.  Finally, the term “unwanted” is 
related to both sudden and forced in that the victim is caught off guard and 
unable to firmly convey that she does not want contact with the offender’s 
mouth.  These situations are not merely kisses without the victim’s consent 
in ambiguous situations.  Rather, they involve the offender putting his mouth 
on the victim’s mouth, cheek, or neck in a sudden way without any indication 
from the victim that she (or he)25 would enjoy, or want, such contact.  
Obviously, context matters.  In Italy, as in other cultures, kisses on the 
cheek that are exchanged as part of a greeting are not sexual acts.  By com-
parison, how Rachel Crooks described her encounter with Donald Trump is 
quite different.  She and Mr. Trump initially shook hands, and Mr. Trump 
began kissing each of her cheeks as one might in Italy.  However, he contin-
ued to go back and forth kissing each of her cheeks before suddenly he kissed 
her directly on her mouth—something neither typical nor culturally expected 
in Italy or in the U.S.  Nor was this kiss anything like the rapport between 
the characters in Casablanca.  Similarly, the situation depicted in the #That-
sHarassment public service announcement described above is not what an 
employee expects of an employer. 
Kisses between two adults in an intimate relationship are extremely un-
likely to be considered criminal.  Indeed, none of the Italian cases I have 
located involve criminal charges for kisses involving two people who were 
or had been in intimate relationships.  Rather, such events involve an em-
ployer forcing himself on an employee.26  In addition, the #MeToo reports 
described in Part V do not involve two adults who had been intimate partners. 
 
 25. Jody Allard, An Unwanted Kiss by a Woman is Still Sexual Assault, ROLE REBOOT 
(Mar. 15, 2018), http://www.rolereboot.org/culture-and-politics/details/2018-03-unwanted-
kiss-woman-still-sexual-assault/ (describing the kiss by Katy Perry of nineteen-year-old 
American Idol contestant, Benjamin Glaze). 
 26. I have not located a case similar to the absurd hypothetical that Cadoppi and Vitiello 
suggest in their article.  See Cadoppi & Vitiello, supra note 7, at 217 n.236. 
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III. SEXUAL VIOLENCE LAW IN ITALY 
I have previously described the 1996 reform of Italian rape law in the 
context of discussing the procedural mechanism called the querela,27 as well 
as in the context of analyzing the provision that allows a judge to reduce a 
sentence for sexual violence in cases of “less seriousness.”28  Efforts to re-
form began in 1979 when over 300,000 Italians signed a proposed reform 
and submitted it to the Italian legislature.29  It was not until 1996 that the 
Italian legislature got around to enacting a law reforming rape and other sex 
offenses.30  Certain key aspects are relevant to this Article’s inquiry: (A) 
How prior law classified rape and other sex crimes; (B) abrogation of the 
prior offenses, “violent carnal knowledge,” and “violent acts of lust;” (C) the 
significance of classifying sexual violence in terms of the harm now pro-
tected by the law; and (D) the 1996 law’s adoption of the term “sexual acts” 
to define sexual violence and how the Corte di Cassazione has interpreted 
this term.  While I address these key aspects separately, understanding how 
they relate to this Article is essential. 
A. Reclassification of Sexual Offenses Under the 1996 Law 
The offense of sexual violence and other sex crimes were moved to the 
section of the penal code entitled, “Delitti contro la persona,” crimes against 
the person or the individual.  Previous laws characterized these offenses as 
“Delitti contro la morale pubblica e il buon costume,” crimes against public 
morality and decency.31  The 1930 penal code included within this classifi-
cation the following offenses: “[c]arnal violence, carnal intercourse commit-
ted through abuse of capacity as a public officer, violent acts of lust, 
 
 27. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Rape and the Querela in Italy: False Protection of Victim 
Agency, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 273, 292-96 (2007).  Briefly stated, a querela is a procedural 
requirement that a victim specifically request prosecution and is an exception to the principle 
of mandatory prosecution that prevails under Italian criminal procedure. 
 28. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Renaissance Redux?  Chastity and Punishment in Italian 
Rape Law, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 335, 337-39 (2008) (analyzing a 2006 opinion in which 
the Corte di Cassazione determined that a defendant who had sexually assaulted the fourteen-
year-old daughter of his girlfriend was entitled to a sentence reduction for “less seriousness” 
because the girl admitted that she had engaged in sexual activity with other men, and the girl 
admitted that when the defendant indicated his intent to sexually assault her, she ‘opted’ for 
oral sex thinking that this would not put her in danger of contracting a sexually transmitted 
disease). 
 29. Reforming Italy’s rape laws was one of several goals of the Italian women’s move-
ment in the 1970s, which sought to end male dominance of all aspects of women’s lives.  See 
e.g., Rachel A. Van Cleave, Luogo e Spazio, Place and Space: Gender Quotas and Democ-
racy in Italy, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 329 (2012).  See ITALIAN FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
EQUALITY AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Graziella Parati & Rebecca West eds., 2002) and 
ITALIAN FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER (Paola Bono & Sandra Kemp eds., 1991), for infor-
mation about the women’s movement in Italy. 
 30. Legge 15 febbraio 1996, n. 66, reprinted in CADOPPI, supra note 10, at 1028. 
 31. See THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 177 
(Edward M. Wise trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1978) [hereinafter Wise translation], for the 
only English translation of the 1930 Italian Penal Code. 
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abduction for purposes of marriage, and abduction for purposes of lust.”32  
The notion that these offenses harmed society’s morals is further illustrated 
by the penal code section that provided for reparatory marriage, as a conven-
ient way of extinguishing a conviction for these offenses in the event there 
was “a marriage contracted between the perpetrator of the offense and the 
victim,”33 thereby restoring individual and family honor.34 
Reclassifying sexual violence recognized that this offense harms indi-
vidual victims more than it does society.35  Sexual violence is now classified 
with offenses such as homicide, assault, and personal injury.36  Reclassifying 
sexual violence as an offense against individual sexual autonomy also re-
quired a new analysis of the harm to be protected.  Indeed, the Corte di Cas-
sazione began to shift analysis away from considering the lustful intentions 
of the offender and whether the offender’s conduct manifested sinful or im-
moral sexual instincts.  Instead, the cases illustrate a greater focus on the 
harm to the victim’s sexual autonomy.  That is, what bene giuridico is pro-
tected under the reformed sexual violence law?  
B. “Carnal Violence” and “Violent Acts of Lust” Repealed by the 1996 
Reform 
The 1996 law abrogated several 1930 sex crimes.37  For the purposes of 
this Article, the relevant provisions repealed were articles 519 and 521.  Ar-
ticle 519 criminalized “violent carnal intercourse,” defined as “[w]hoever, 
by violence or threats, compels another to have carnal intercourse shall be 
 
 32. C. p.arts. 519-23 (1930) (It.), translated in the Wise translation, supra note 31, at 
177–78. 
 33. Id. art. 544, translated in the Wise translation, supra note 31, at 182-83.  Italy re-
pealed article 544 in 1981.  Legge 5 agosto 1981, n. 442. 
 34. See Van Cleave, supra note 12. 
 35. TAMAR PITCH, UN DIRITTO PER DUE 150 (1998).  See Caroline Davidson, Rape in 
Context: Lessons for the United States from the International Criminal Court, 39 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1191, 1197-1219 (2018), for a description of a similar evolution of International 
Criminal Law of sexual assault and rape. 
 36. C.p. arts. 575, 581, & 582, translated in the Wise translation, supra note 31, at 192, 
194-95. 
 37. CADOPPI, supra note 10, at 1028–32 (reproducing the 1996 law reforming sexual 
violence law).  Article 1 of the 1996 law repealed the following articles, in addition to the two 
discussed above: carnal intercourse committed through abuse of capacity as a public officer; 
abduction for purposes of marriage; abduction for purposes of lust; abduction of a person 
under the age of 14 years or infirm; for purposes of lust or marriage; a provision reducing 
punishment for any of the three abduction offenses if the offender brings the person abducted 
back to her family; seduction through promise of marriage committed by a married man; cor-
ruption of youth; a provision prohibiting an offender from claiming ignorance regarding the 
age of the victim when she was under 14; a provision setting out collateral punishments and 
other consequences when the offender was the parent, husband, or guardian of the victim; and 
two provisions regarding the querela.  Legge 15 febbraio 1996, n. 66, art. 1. 
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punished by imprisonment for from three to ten years.”38  Article 521 crimi-
nalized “violent acts of lust” as “[w]hoever, [by violence or threats] . . . com-
mits on another acts of lust other than carnal intercourse . . . shall be punished 
for from two to six years.”39  Several reasons explain the repeal of these two 
offenses.  For instance, the rejection of the assumption under prior law that 
violent sexual intercourse was more serious than other violent sexual con-
duct that did not result in penetration.40  Similar to jurisprudence in the 
United States,41 Italian courts and scholars have devoted significant attention 
to the question of how much penetration occurred and how much was re-
quired to find a defendant guilty of the more serious offense of violent carnal 
knowledge.42  By repealing articles 519 and 521, the 1996 law rejected the 
idea that the mere lack of penetration would necessarily make a violent sex-
ual offense less serious.43 In addition, a court seeking to decide which of the 
two offenses defined the defendant’s guilt had to determine whether there 
was any penetration of or by the genitalia of either the victim or the defend-
ant.44  This required, what has been described as, “humiliating” testimony 
from the injured person, often turning the victim into a “second defendant” 
since she had to explain with detail and precision what occurred.45  
 
 38. ALBERTO CADOPPI ET AL., TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PENALE, PARTE SPECIALE, 
MATERIALI 250 (2011) (reproducing article 519 under the codice Rocco).  See the Wise trans-
lation, supra note 31, for the English translation. 
 39. Id. at 250-51.  See the Wise translation, supra note 31, for the English translation. 
 40. See Van Cleave, supra note 28, at 339 n.24 (citing Chiara Foladore, Sulla nozione 
degli atti sessuali “di minore gravità” prevista dall’art. 609-bis c.p., XLI Cass. Pen., Apr. 
2001, at 1500, 1501). 
 41. As to the Model Penal Code (MPC), the American Law Institute’s (ALI) current 
efforts to reform the MPC provisions on rape and sexual assault, continues to include the 
offense of rape as “forcible sexual penetration.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 
RELATED OFFENSES § 213.1, at app. A (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).  See 
Davidson, supra note 35, at 1200 (discussing the recent ALI MPC reforms in depth).  In ad-
dition, more recently, Brock Turner was not charged with rape under California law, which is 
the most serious sex crime.  At the time, the law was understood to require penetration with 
the defendant’s penis.  Turner penetrated the victim with his fingers.  California law has since 
been amended to define rape as penetration with any foreign object.  People v. Turner, No. 
Ho 43709, 2018 WL 3751731, at *1-9 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
263.1 (“The Legislature finds and declares that all forms of nonconsensual sexual assault may 
be considered rape for purposes of the gravity of the offense and the support of the survi-
vors.”). 
 42. Valentina Ventura, La tutela della libertà sessuale del maggiorenne, in I DELITTI 
CONTRO LA LIBERTÀ SESSUALE 61, 96 (Tovani and Trinci eds., 2014); Alberto Cadoppi, Art. 
609-bis c.p., in COMMENTARIO DELLE NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA SESSUALE E CONTRO LA 
PEDOFILIA 451–52 (4th ed. 2006); see MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED 
OFFENSES § 213.1 (“[P]hysical force in felony sex offenses . . . require[s] only a slight show-
ing of force.”). 
 43. Chiara Foladore, Sulla nozione degli atti sessuali “di minore gravità” prevista 
dall’art. 609-bis c.p., XLI Cass. Pen., Apr. 2001, at 1500, 1501. 
 44. Ventura, supra note 42, at 70. 
 45. See Van Cleave, supra note 28, at 337–39 (citing Alberto Cadoppi, Articolo 3 in 
COMMENTARI DELLE NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA SESSUALE E DELLA LEGGE CONTRO LA 
PEDOFILIA 25, 27 (Cadoppi ed., 2d ed. 1999)). 
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Many Italian scholars have taken the position that repealing articles 519 
and 524 cannot have resulted in a tabula rasa when it comes to understand-
ing sexual violence and assert that the term “sexual acts” in the 1996 law 
intended to unify the prior offenses of carnal violence and violent acts of 
lust.46  For purposes of this project, a greater understanding of how the of-
fense “violent acts of lust” was defined before the 1996 law repealed this 
crime is helpful to understanding how Cassazione has approached defining 
sexual violence under the 1996 law. 
The archaic term “violent acts of lust” long predates the 1930 Rocco 
Code as an offense intended to protect collective morals and societal notions 
of decency and reflected the view that sex was sinful.47  Thus, courts applied 
a subjective definition to the offense based on the intentions of the defendant 
and conduct that manifested the offender’s lust.48  Physical touchings con-
sidered sufficient to establish this offense were not limited to genitalia or 
erogenous zones since physical contact with other parts of the victim’s body 
could also stimulate the offender’s sexual excitement.49  The offender’s in-
tent to gratify or fulfill his sexual instinct was considered harmful to soci-
ety’s morals and sense of decency and modesty.50 
A case decided shortly before the 1996 law was enacted provides an 
example of how Cassazione gave meaning to the term “violent acts of lust” 
as recently as 1995.51  The defendant, Delogu, was convicted in the trial court 
of “violent acts of lust” pursuant to penal code article 521 for having kissed 
the cheek and neck of the victim, his employee.52  He was sentenced to one 
year and four months imprisonment, which was conditionally suspended.53  
The appellate court granted Delogu’s request to keep the conviction off of 
his permanent record, and otherwise affirmed the trial court.54  Delogu ap-
pealed to the Corte di Cassazione arguing that the fleeting kisses were not 
lustful.55 In its decision reversing the conviction, the Court described the de-
cision of the trial court.56  The trial court held that the kisses by the defendant 
were a manifestation of his lustful intentions and his sexual appetite.57  Fur-
thermore, the trial court held that the element of violence was shown by the 
 
 46. Ventura, supra note 42, at 96; see also Cadoppi, Articolo 3, supra note 45, at 26–
27. 
 47. Cadoppi, Articolo 3, supra note 45, at 28. 
 48. Id. at 38. 
 49. Id. at 38, 39. 
 50. Id. at 40. 
 51. Delogu case, supra note 22. 
 52. Id. at 962. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 962, 963. 
 57. Id. at 963. 
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sudden way in which he kissed the victim such that she had no opportunity 
to resist or express her lack of consent to being kissed.58  
In quoting opinions from the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s Cassazione fo-
cused on the requirement that for a kiss to be punished as an act of lust, it 
must exhibit eroticism and be given in such a way as to indicate the of-
fender’s sexual excitement.59  This meant that it must be on a part of the 
victim’s body to indicate the defendant’s lustful intentions.60  According to 
Cassazione “[a] fleeting kiss without more and without insistence is not an 
act of lust.”61   
Cassazione marveled at the fact that the trial court did not consider the 
postmodern society62 in which kisses, other than on the mouth or on ero-
genous areas, have simply lost their immodest character.63  The Court 
pointed to the fact that young people freely hug and kiss in public and that 
“red light films” are freely shown in movie theaters, exhibiting nude men 
and women.64  The Court also pointed to the billboards and other advertise-
ments in public, which display intimate body parts, concluding, “in the cur-
rent environment it is not possible to hold that a kiss on the cheek and neck 
are violent acts of lust if given to one who does not consent.”65  It is difficult 
to understand the relevance of apparently consensual kisses and hugs in pub-
lic that the Court refers to with the facts involving an employer treating an 
employee in this way.  The opinion does not provide additional details about 
the incident, but it is clear that the victim did not want the defendant to kiss 
her.  The relevance of the Court’s reference to public displays of affection 
affirms the notion that the law’s purpose was to protect public decency and 
morals, not an individual’s sexual autonomy.  By focusing on the collective 
good to be protected, as well as more permissive attitudes of sexuality, the 
Court made the victim’s lack of consent and any harm to the victim’s sexual 
autonomy completely irrelevant to the analysis. 
The Court went on to state, “various aspects of a particular society pro-
ceed along parallel lines, each influencing the other, and it’s not possible to 
have progress in one area while retaining old traditions in another.”66  Ac-
cording to the Court, “[i]n an era in which women have achieved complete 
freedom, working side-by-side with men in the workplace, the definition of 
violent acts of lust must also be modernized to include only those touches 
that unequivocally manifest sexual desire and thrill.”67  Once again, the 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 962, 964. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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Court’s reliance on societal changes in the workplace and relationships be-
tween men and women seems to raise the bar for proving that physical con-
tact such as an unwanted, sudden kiss amounts to an offense.  Indeed, the 
Court seems to imply that this is the price women must pay for equality.  The 
Court concluded by acknowledging “the disagreeable nature of the facts”68 
before them involving an employer acting this way toward an employee, but 
ultimately found that the facts did not support a conviction for violent acts 
of lust and overturned the conviction.69 
The Court’s emphasis on the changes in society’s mores about sexuality 
and immodesty represents a sharp focus on the harm that the prior offense 
was intended to protect; that is, collective notions of decency and morality.  
Rather than representing a post-modern notion of sexual norms, this opinion 
reflects very clearly the traditional understanding of sexual offenses, which 
had little to no regard for harm to the sexual autonomy of the individual vic-
tim.  By considering the sexual nature of a kiss in the abstract, free of the 
facts involved in the specific case, the Court narrowed the notion of what 
offends societal decency and modesty.  
Similarly, another case, decided only months after the 1996 law went 
into effect, also involved the prior offense of violent acts of lust, and further 
brings into focus the nature of the Court’s analysis under the prior law.  In 
Corsaro,70 the defendant stopped the victim, his employee, and said, “every 
time I see you, I want to touch you.  Let me touch you,” but he managed only 
to brush her face with his lips, although it was clear that he intended to kiss 
her.71  In this case, the incident occurred before the 1996 law took effect, 
thus the Court considered whether the conduct was an attempted “violent act 
of lust.”72  The Court characterized the defendant’s conduct in “stopping” 
the victim as not sufficient to amount to violence, as required by the prior 
law, in particular, since the victim was easily able to avoid being kissed.73  
The Court held, consistent with Delogu and other prior cases, that a fleeting 
touch was not a sufficient manifestation of the defendant’s lustful inten-
tions—the harm protected by the prior law.  
The next section elaborates more on the Italian notion of the bene giu-
ridico, protected by the repealed offenses, under the 1996 law. 
C. The “Bene Giuridico” Protected by the 1996 Reform  
The Italian term for the rights entitled to state protection pursuant to the 
criminal law is bene giuridico, which Watkin translates as a legal “good, 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 965. 
 70. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 9 ottobre 1997, Corsaro, reprinted in Foro it., 1998, II, 505, 512. 
 71. Id. at 512. 
 72. Id. at 512–13. 
 73. Id. at 513. 
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benefit or an asset.”74  This term, as used in Italian jurisprudence, can be 
traced back to the writings of Cesare Beccaria.75  In addition to his philoso-
phy opposing torture and the death penalty,76 Beccaria’s writings supported 
the notion that the state’s power to punish should be both limited and exclu-
sive.77  According to Beccaria, the state’s power is limited in the sense that 
the state should not punish for sins, but only for crimes defined by law.78  
That is, the state should not punish conduct that offends only religious or 
moral values.79  This distinction between sins and crimes was guided by the 
principle that the state is justified in inflicting punishment only for conduct 
that “violates or endangers the rights of others.”80  
The offenses of “violent carnal intercourse” and “violent acts of lust” 
came within the first chapter of Title IX of the Penal Code, entitled, “crimes 
against sexual liberty” indicating some understanding of these offenses as 
harming individuals.81  Nonetheless, it appears inconsistent to entitle this 
chapter “crimes against sexual liberty” within the title setting out “crimes 
against public morality and decency.”  In particular, this inconsistency 
makes it difficult to determine the bene giuridico to be protected by the 
crimes of carnal violence and violent acts of lust, under Italian law before 
the 1996 reform.  Trinci explains that the fascist legislature did not consider 
sexual liberty to be an individual right, but rather a right that was used to 
realize particular social and economic goals.82  Specifically, protecting an 
individual’s (typically, a woman’s) sexual liberty was the way to protect 
more important interests beyond those of the individual, such as, family 
honor and the authority of the father or the husband.  The Court’s analysis in 
Delogu is a representative example of this focus on protecting societal mo-
rality and modesty. 
Classifying sexual violence as a crime against an individual in 1996 
indicated a shift in the understanding of the bene giuridico to be protected 
by the law.  Instead of protecting public morals and decency, a “collective”83 
bene giuridico, the offense of sexual violence is intended to protect the 
 
 74. Van Cleave, supra note 27, at 281 (citing THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, THE ITALIAN 
LEGAL TRADITION 122 (1997)). 
 75. See generally the Wise translation, supra note 31(discussing Beccaria’s influence); 
see also Van Cleave, supra note 27, at 280-82 (discussing Beccaria’s influence and the mean-
ing of bene giuridico in the context of sex crimes). 
 76. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963). 
 77. Van Cleave, supra note 27, at 281. 
 78. CARL LUDWIG VON BAR ET AL., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 414 
(Thomas S. Bell et al. trans., 1916). 
 79. Id. at 415. 
 80. Id. 
 81. ALESSANDRO TRINCI, INTRODUZIONE AD UNO STUDIO “AGGREGATO” DEI DELITTI 
CONTRO LA LIBERTÀ SESSUALE, in I DELITTI CONTRO LA LIBERTÀ SESSUALE 1, 15 (Tovani and 
Trinci eds., 2014). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Marco Galdieri, L’atto assume rilevanza penale se lede la libertà di 
autodeterminazione, 37 GUIDA AL DIRITTO 90, 91 (2006). 
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sexual liberty and sexual autonomy of the individual victim.  As discussed 
below, scholarly commentary about the change in classification asserts that 
the term “sexual acts” in the 1996 law was used to unify the two prior of-
fenses of violent carnal intercourse and violent acts of lust.  Yet, it is difficult 
to conclude that this is consistent with the change in the bene giuridico to be 
protected.  If, by use of the term “unify,” commentators contend that the 
1996 law intended to enact only one crime, “sexual violence,” rather than 
continue to define two separate offenses, this makes sense.  However, several 
Italian commentators have argued that in defining one offense, the legislature 
intended to decriminalize the least serious situations, like kisses and other 
touchings, such as pats.84  
In commenting on the Delogu case, Stefania Tabarelli de Fatis explains 
that, under the 1996 sexual violence law, the bene giuridico has changed to 
protecting the sexual autonomy of individuals and suggests that a similar 
case under the 1996 law could result in a different outcome.85  Decisions by 
the Court applying the 1996 law, discussed below, confirm this analysis. 
D. “Sexual Acts” and Forced Kisses Under the 1996 Law 
The term “sexual acts” under the reformed law is not otherwise defined 
in the criminal code.  As discussed above, most Italian scholars have claimed 
that the term was intended to unify the two previously separate offenses of 
violent carnal intercourse and violent acts of lust.86  Under the prior law, 
violent carnal intercourse was punished more severely than violent acts of 
lust and required the evidence to show that the defendant had penetrated the 
victim’s vagina, although the Corte di Cassazione had concluded that the 
offense also included oral and anal penetration.87  The offense of “violent 
acts of lust” was undefined in the prior Penal Code, other than specifying 
that “violent acts of lust” did not include violent carnal knowledge, as that 
was a separate offense.  The Delogu case, described above is an illustrative 
example of the Court’s focus on the collective decency, which these offenses 
protected.  Both offenses were within the section of the Penal Code entitled 
“crimes against public morality and good custom.”88  The 1996 reform 
placed the offense of sexual violence within the portion of the Penal Code 
entitled “crimes against the person.”  
A number of Italian scholars assert that the offense of sexual violence 
was intended to be narrower than “violent acts of lust” and bemoan the fact 
 
 84. Cadoppi, Art. 609-bis c.p., supra note 42. 
 85. Tabarelli de Fatis, supra note 24, at 980 (article 609-bis refers to an invasion of the 
sexual sphere of another). 
 86. Cadoppi, Articolo 3, supra note 45, at 42. 
 87. Francesco Macrí, La giurisprudenza di legittimità sugli atti sessuali tra 
interpretazione estensiva e analogia in malem partem, DIRITTO PENALE E PROCESSO, 2007, at 
109-10 n.1, 109, 110 n.10. (Cassazione cases: Cass., sez. III 23 marzo 1988, in Giust. Pen., 
1989, II, 432). 
 88. C.p. 519, 520, and 521 (It. 1931), the so-called “codice Rocco.”; CADOPPI ET AL., 
supra note 38. 
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that trivial cases involving sudden unwanted kisses continue to take up the 
time and resources of the judicial system.89  While beyond the scope of this 
Article, there is an interesting story about how Italian scholars (la dottrina)90 
have concluded that, only in limited situations, may a kiss constitute sexual 
assault, while the Corte di Cassazione has not adhered to this approach.  
A decision by the Corte di Cassazione shortly after the 1996 law was 
enacted illustrates a sharp contrast to the analysis of the Court in the Delogu 
case.  In a 1998 decision,91 the Court considered an appeal from a conviction 
of violent acts of lust, under the repealed law involving circumstances simi-
lar to those in Delogu.92  In this case, the defendant, Di Francia, approached 
the victim, held her arms at her shoulders, and pulled her toward him while 
repeating the word “amore” (love) while trying to kiss her on her mouth.93  
The victim managed to turn her head and he kissed her on her cheek before 
she pushed him away while he continued to say “amore.”94  The incident 
occurred before the 1996 law was enacted, and therefore the Court consid-
ered the prior law as well as the newer law since the defendant argued that if 
his conduct would not be a crime under the 1996 law, he should not be pun-
ished even under the prior law.95  
While the Court refers to the Delogu decision, it emphasized the signif-
icance of the reclassification of sexual violence as a crime against the indi-
vidual.96 The Court held that “[t]his offense [was] no longer about protecting 
collective notions of modesty and decency, but about protecting an individ-
ual’s right to determine his or her sexual activity.”97  That is, the bene giu-
ridico is different.98 Therefore, according to the Court, the defendant’s con-
duct must be evaluated based on the harm to the victim’s sexual autonomy 
and dignity.99  The Court stated that sexual acts should be defined objectively 
rather than based on the subjective lustful intentions of the defendant, as was 
the case under the prior law.100  There must be a “bodily contact, which is 
not necessarily limited to genital areas, but includes all areas that science, 
psychology and socio-anthropology consider erogenous, such as to 
 
 89. G. Fiandaca, La rilevanza penale del “bacio” tra anatomia a cultura Foro it., 1998, 
II, 505, n. 1–2, I. 
 90. JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 60 (4th ed. 2019). 
 91. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 27 Aprile 1998, Di Francia, reprinted in Foro it., 1998, II, 505. 
 92. Fiandaca, supra note 89, at n. 1–2, I. 
 93. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 27 Aprile 1998, Di Francia, reprinted in Foro it., 1998, II, 505, 
509. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 506–07. 
 96. Id. at 510. 
 97. Id. at 510. 
 98. Id. at 511–12. 
 99. Id. at 510. 
 100. Id. at 511. 
644 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:627 
demonstrate [the offender’s] sexual instinct.”101  The Court indicated that 
this definition under the 1996 law is narrower than the old crime of violent 
acts of lust and that such narrowing was justified because when the crime of 
molestie sessuali was considered by the legislature, this provision was ulti-
mately not included in the 1996 law and the least serious types of conduct 
might amount to other offenses, such as molestia, or obscenity.102 
Thus, in Di Francia, the Court gave effect to the change in the bene 
giuridico to be protected under the 1996 law by focusing on the harm to the 
victim based on an invasion of her sexual sphere.  Moreover, the Court con-
sidered the full context of the defendant’s conduct which, like Delogu, in-
volved an employer trying to kiss his employee.  Rather than pointing to the 
changes in Italian society regarding sexual modesty and decency, the Court 
focused on the harm to the victim and the need for a more objective definition 
of sexual acts, one which considers science, psychology, and socio-anthro-
pology.  The Court emphasized that the offense of sexual violence is no 
longer tied to cultural and social mores, but is instead focused on an individ-
ual’s right to sexual autonomy.103  In addition, the Court emphasized the im-
portance of considering the full context in which a sudden, unwanted kiss 
occurs.  Specifically, the Court stated that “circumstances such as time, 
place, the manner in which [a kiss] was given, as well as the circumstances 
of the two people involved since [a kiss] could manifest numerous intentions, 
as well as where on the body [of the victim] it was given…by an employer 
to an employee, none of which is irrelevant to the analysis.”104  Thus, in es-
chewing an analysis that considers only the subjective lustful intentions of 
the offender, and the harm to public modesty, the Court has indicated that, 
while the location of the kiss on the victim’s body is relevant, the full context 
of the encounter must also be considered in evaluating whether the conduct 
intrudes on the victim’s sexual sphere and amounts to the offense of sexual 
violence. 
The fact that the Court points to the employer/employee relationship 
raises another aspect of the 1996 reform relevant to this analysis.  The 1996 
law defines sexual violence as “whoever, by violence or threats or abuse of 
authority compels another to do or submit to sexual acts shall be imprisoned 
from five to ten years.”105  While a full analysis of the phrase “abuse of au-
thority” is beyond the scope of this article, it pertains to the context to which 
the Court in Di Francia refers; specifically, the fact that the employer sought 
to kiss his employee.  In Delogu, the Court’s decision—that the facts of the 
case did not support the offense of “violent acts of lust”—rested in part on 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 505, 511.  C.p. 660 (It.) (annoying or disturbing persons).  C.p. XXX (obscen-
ity), translated in the Wise translation, supra note 31, at 182–83. 
 103. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 27 Aprile 1998, Di Francia, reprinted in Foro it., 1998, II, 505, 
510. 
 104. Id. 
 105. C.p. 609-bis (It.) (emphasis added). 
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its conclusion that the “fleeting kiss, without further insistence,” was not “vi-
olent” for purposes of that offense.106  While the prior law included an of-
fense entitled “carnal intercourse committed through abuse of capacity as a 
public officer,”107 the 1996 law includes a broader concept of “abuse of au-
thority” as one method, like violence or threats, to accomplish sexual vio-
lence under 609-bis.  Emphasizing the employer/employee relationship in Di 
Francia would seem to allow for consideration of the employer’s authority 
over the employee and minimize or eliminate the need to demonstrate that 
the offender accomplished the sexual act through violence or threats.  
In a 1998 decision, the Court further clarified when sudden, unwanted 
kisses and other touchings come within the term “sexual acts” for purposes 
of the sexual violence law.108  This case involved a 14-year-old victim109 
whom the offender, over the course of about seven months, kissed on the 
lips, touched her breasts, thighs, and bottom.  On appeal, the Court cited to 
its Di Francia decision and emphasized that the crime of sexual violence is 
intended to protect the sexual autonomy of the victim.110  Therefore, in eval-
uating whether the offender engaged in “sexual acts,” the Court considered 
whether the touchings by the defendant intruded on the sexual sphere of the 
victim.111  The Court concluded that the nature of the offender’s conduct did 
intrude on the victim’s sexual sphere and was coercive since the offender 
employed the victim’s mother.112 
In the 2006 case113 discussed by Professors Cadoppi and Vitiello,114 a 
police chief was convicted of sexual violence when he coerced his subordi-
nate to submit to kisses on her cheek and neck.  Upon finding that the case 
was one of “less seriousness,”115 the trial court sentenced the defendant to 
one year and two months of incarceration, and the appellate court af-
firmed.116  The police chief had commanded his female assistant to drive to 
 
 106. Delogu case, supra note 22; see Tabarelli de Fatis, supra note 24, at 975 (explaining 
the Court’s conclusion that sudden, unexpected conduct by an offender does not satisfy the 
element of “violence” required by the law). 
 107. C.p. 520 (It. 1930), translated in the Wise translation, supra note 31, at 182-83. 
 108. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 4 dicembre 1998, De Marco, reprinted in La Giustizia Penale, 
1999, Part II, 584 [hereinafter De Marco case]. 
 109. The 1996 law sets the age of consent at fourteen therefore article 609-bis was the 
basis for De Marco’s conviction.  Article 609-ter sets out aggravating circumstances, which 
trigger a more severe punishment from six to twelve years.  This includes when the victim is 
under the age of fourteen. 
 110. De Marco case, supra note 108, at 586. 
 111. Id. at 585. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Cass. Pen., sez. III, 26 gennaio 2006, n. 19808, reprinted in 37 GUIDA AL DIRITTO 
88 (Sept. 23, 2006). 
 114. Cadoppi & Vitiello, supra note 7. 
 115. C.p. 609-bis, para. 3 (It.).  See Van Cleave, supra note 28, at 337–39, for more anal-
ysis of this paragraph, which provides for a reduced sentence in cases of less seriousness. 
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a beach.117  Once she turned off the engine, he suddenly grabbed her and 
tried to kiss her, but she pushed him away and covered his mouth with her 
hand.118  He then ordered her to drive to another isolated location with a 
panoramic view, where, for the second time, he attempted to kiss her, hold-
ing her arms and kissing her on the neck, despite her clear objection.119  The 
Court reaffirmed the notion that the 1996 law is not intended to criminalize 
conduct that was previously considered to be offensive to public morality 
and decency.120  While the Court acknowledged that the term “sexual acts” 
generally means the sum of the prior criminal conduct of “violent carnal 
knowledge” and “violent acts of lust,” the Court, as in the Di Francia case, 
emphasized that conduct which qualifies as a “sexual act” is contact with 
another that harms or endangers the liberty and autonomy of a victim’s sex-
ual sphere.121  
While the Court recognized that scholars have concluded that acts by 
an offender, which are accomplished by surprise or [suddenness] are not “vi-
olent” for purposes of the criminal law, the Court reaffirmed that the element 
of violence does not require actual constraint of the victim such that she is 
unable to resist, but includes sudden and rapid conduct which overcomes the 
victim’s opposition [or lack of consent].122  In this case, the Court concluded 
that the lower courts were correct in finding that the offender’s sudden and 
rapid conduct resulting in kissing his subordinate justified his conviction for 
sexual violence.123  The Court also refered to the “abuse of authority” lan-
guage in 609-bis as one method by which an offender compels another to 
submit to sexual acts and explained that the full context is to be considered 
to determine whether there was coercion.124  The fact that the offender, the 
victim’s superior officer, commanded the victim to go to the isolated loca-
tions, where he suddenly grabbed her and tried to kiss her, also supported the 
conviction.125  The Court did not address the defendant’s argument that his 
conduct was merely a “pass” and not harmful to the victim’s sexual auton-
omy.126 
In commenting on this case, Marco Galdieri, points out that the Court’s 
analysis is consistent with its focus on the different bene giuridico protected 
by the 1996 law as compared to the repealed offense of “violent acts of 
lust.”127  However, Galdieri nonetheless criticizes the Court’s decision, 
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signaling that the Court has diverged from the opinion of a majority of legal 
scholars (la dottrina) by concluding that one who tries to give a kiss may be 
convicted of sexual violence.128  A number of Italian scholars have argued 
that under the 1996 law, the term “sexual acts,” can include only kisses on a 
victim’s erogenous zones, or so-called “profound” kisses on the victim’s 
mouth.129  Indeed, co-authors, Cadoppi and Vitiello, describe the officer’s 
conduct toward his subordinate as “clumsy attempts [which] ended once his 
second kiss was rebuffed, suggesting he got the point, if belatedly.”130  While 
acknowledging that the defendant “violated his victim’s autonomy by at-
tempting to kiss her twice,”131 Professor Vitiello concludes that “an un-
wanted kiss is likely to arise in too many ambiguous situations to leave the 
blundering male open to criminal prosecution.”132  The fact that conduct that 
is harmful to another person’s sexual autonomy occurs with great frequency, 
would support an argument for invoking the criminal law to address such 
conduct.  In addition, the assumption that unwanted kisses are likely to arise 
in ambiguous situations belies the types of cases that the Italian Supreme 
Court has considered since 1996 and belies the number of situations that have 
been reported since the beginning of the #MeToo era. 
A 2012 decision by the Corte di Cassazione is another illustration of 
the Court’s focus on protecting the sexual autonomy of the victim.133  In this 
case, the Court concluded that the offender’s lips merely brushing the face 
of the victim can support a conviction for sexual violence when this occurs 
suddenly without the victim’s consent.134  The defendant claimed that the 
kiss on the cheek of the victim was simply a sign of affection since they had 
known each other for seven years and maintained a cordial relationship.135  
In fact, the defendant was the doorman of the apartment building where the 
victim lived with her parents.136  The lower court found the victim credible 
and she recounted that the offender went to her apartment when her parents 
were not home and tried to kiss her on the mouth, but upon seeing her re-
sistance, he quickly kissed her cheek.137  He was sentenced to one year and 
two months under paragraph three of article 609-bis, based on a conclusion 
that the offense was one of “less seriousness.”  In addition, the punishment 
was suspended.138  On appeal, the defendant argued that the facts did not 
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constitute sexual violence since all that was involved was a “simple kiss on 
the cheek.”139  The Court dismissed this argument and affirmed the convic-
tion.140  
Mereu, an Italian scholar, has criticized this decision because the Court 
affirmed a criminal conviction for an unwanted kiss without any evidence of 
violence, threat, or abuse of authority.141  Mereu also criticizes the Court for 
affirming a conviction for sexual violence based on a sudden kiss without 
the victim’s consent, arguing that the Court has, in effect, changed the ele-
ments required to establish sexual violence.142  The Court held that the rapid 
manner by which the defendant kissed the victim compelled her to submit.143  
Mereu further criticizes the Court for its reference to the defendant’s goal of 
satisfying his own lustful instincts.144  She claims that this is a retreat to pre-
1996 analysis, which focused on protecting public decency and modesty.145  
However, the Court’s reference to the defendant’s intention was in the con-
text of describing how the defendant’s conduct progressed from asking the 
victim for kisses, to trying to kiss her on her mouth and seeing that she did 
not want this, and then suddenly kissing her on her cheek.146  In other words, 
the defendant knew that the victim did not want him to kiss her, yet he made 
clear his intent to kiss her despite this fact.  Thus, the Court was focused on 
protecting the sexual autonomy of the victim. 
More recently, the Court has devoted significant attention to setting out 
the facts and factual contexts relevant to evaluating whether a sudden, un-
wanted kiss is a “sexual act” for purposes of 609-bis.  In a 2015 decision, the 
Court considered an appeal by a doctor convicted of sexual violence.147  The 
defendant, R., a doctor at a nursing home, briskly strode into a small break 
room where S., a nurse, was sitting at a table folding napkins.148  R ap-
proached S from behind and then kissed her suddenly and forcefully on the 
lips.149  S pushed him away saying, “how dare you!”150  The Court affirmed 
R’s conviction and set out relevant factors when giving meaning to the term 
“sexual acts.”151  The Court reaffirmed prior definitions, which included 
“physical contact, even sudden and extemporaneous, between the 
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individuals . . . which endangers the sexual autonomy of the victim . . . and 
the intention of the defendant to satisfy his sexual pleasure.”152  The Court 
explained that this involves an objective definition of the type of physical 
contact that invades one’s sexual sphere, not necessarily limited to genital 
areas, but may include [other] erogenous zones.153 
The Court acknowledged that it is impossible to define in advance all 
sexual acts that do not directly and clearly involve the victim’s erogenous 
zones.154  Therefore, the entire context of the defendant’s conduct must be 
considered when determining whether the conduct compromised the sexual 
autonomy of the victim.155  Considering the context of the defendant’s con-
duct includes considering the nature of the physical contact and where on the 
victim’s body the kiss was given, the way in which the kiss was given (i.e., 
with intensity or not), the physical context of the encounter (in public, in the 
workplace, in private, the time of day), the relationship between the parties, 
and other facts relevant to the harm to the victim’s sexual autonomy.156  In 
particular, the Court relied on the lower court’s determination that during the 
time both R and S had been colleagues, they only ever greeted each other 
with “good morning” and “good evening,” supporting the conclusion that 
this “sudden and ambushing kiss” violated the victim’s sexual autonomy.157  
Again, in criticizing the Court’s opinion in this case, at least one scholar has 
lamented the attention devoted to the “problematic knot of defining the least 
serious conduct that comes within” article 609-bis.158 
What emerges from these cases, as well as some of the scholarly cri-
tiques, is first how the overall goal (or bene giuridico) of the sexual violence 
law is to protect the sexual autonomy of victims.  The Corte di Cassazione 
has determined that defining “sexual acts” be informed by what infringes on 
a victim’s sexual autonomy, not by relying on pre-1996 analysis that cen-
tered on societal decency and modesty.159  It appears that the Corte di Cas-
sazione has clarified that both objective and subjective considerations are 
relevant to this analysis.160  In the case of the doctor, R., above, the Court has 
specified that physical contact is required and that such contact with genitalia 
and genital areas is sufficient to constitute a sexual act, as is contact with 
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other erogenous zones.161  The Court has eschewed the approach of scholars 
to exclude from consideration as sexual acts kisses that are not on the vic-
tim’s mouth and not “profound.”162  The Court also considers a subjective 
component, which evaluates the general intent of the offender to engage in 
an act invasive and harmful of the victim’s sexual autonomy.163  This ap-
proach does not involve an inquiry into the specific intent of the offender to 
achieve sexual arousal or gratification, as this would retreat to pre-1996 anal-
ysis that tied the offender’s specific intent with the goal of protecting societal 
decency and modesty.  In addition, the Court has determined that the sudden 
way in which the defendant kisses the victim may satisfy the “violent” ele-
ment of the offense, since the victim is unable to avoid the kiss.164  Finally, 
the Court has clarified that the full context of the encounter is relevant to this 
inquiry.165 
The following section of this Article compares the approach by the 
Corte di Cassazione with laws in the United States.  A review of the laws in 
both California and Michigan illustrate a much narrower approach to the is-
sues of (1) what body parts of the victim touched by the offender might give 
rise to a crime; (2) what evidence regarding the intent of the offender is re-
quired; and (3) what is required to satisfy an element of force or violence.166  
It appears clear that the types of incidents described above, as well as many 
of those described in Part V are unlikely to result in criminal convictions 
under US law. 
IV. BRIEF COMPARISON TO SEXUAL BATTERY LAWS IN THE U.S. 
California law defines sexual battery much more narrowly than Italian 
law, as “[a]ny person who touches an intimate part of another person while 
that person is unlawfully restrained by the accused or an accomplice, and if 
the touching is against the will of the person touched and is for the purpose 
of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.”167  This is consider-
ably narrower than what might constitute sexual violence under Italian law 
by requiring that the defendant or an accomplice unlawfully restrain the vic-
tim and that the touching be for the specific purpose of the defendant’s sexual 
arousal.  In Italy, the Court has explicitly not required this type of specific 
purpose.168  
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The California statute also defines “intimate part” more narrowly than 
under Italian law, as “the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any per-
son, and the breast of a female,”169 clearly excluding kisses on the mouth, 
cheek, or neck as occurred in a number of the Italian cases described above.  
This definition also excludes other possible “erogenous zones,” which the 
Italian Supreme Court has recognized as “touchings,” and as such, may in-
terfere with or harm the sexual autonomy of the victim and amount to the 
crime of sexual violence, depending on the context.  While California also 
includes misdemeanor sexual battery, the only difference is that there is no 
element of unlawful constraint of the victim for conviction of the misde-
meanor.170  The same term and definition of “intimate part” is used to de-
scribe the misdemeanor offense.171  The punishment for this misdemeanor is 
up to six months imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine up to $2,000, or 
both.172  This is significantly less than the punishment that could be imposed 
in Italy for sexual violence, that is “less serious,” of fourteen months.173  
However, in the cases reviewed above, when the Corte di Cassazione upheld 
a conviction, the punishment was usually suspended, and the defendants 
were usually granted requests that the offense not appear on their permanent 
criminal records.174  Interestingly, under California’s misdemeanor sexual 
battery provision, if the defendant is the victim’s employer, the defendant’s 
fine may increase up to $3,000, while jail time remains the same.175 
It is pretty clear that most of the Italian cases described above would 
not have resulted in convictions, and probably not even arrests or prosecu-
tions under California law.  Unlike how the Italian Supreme Court has inter-
preted the crime of “sexual violence”—by emphasizing the goal of protect-
ing the sexual autonomy of the victim—the California law focuses on the 
specific intentions of the offender and limits the offense to touchings of “in-
timate parts” of the victim’s body, limited to genitalia, female breasts, groin, 
or buttocks.176  By comparison to the Italian approach in the context of sud-
den kisses, consideration of the victim is limited to whether such kisses were 
“against [her] will.”177  As the Italian cases illustrate, when the kiss is so 
sudden and unexpected, there may not be an opportunity for the victim to 
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express that the kiss is unwanted.178  Indeed, the Corte di Cassazione has 
determined that the sudden nature of the kiss can establish the violence oth-
erwise required for the offense.179  It seems unlikely that this would be the 
case under California law as to either sexual battery or misdemeanor sexual 
battery.180  Similarly, the #ThatsHarassment public service announcement 
described at the beginning of this Article would not result in misdemeanor 
sexual battery charges under California law because the boss’ kiss was not 
on a statutorily defined “intimate part” of his employee. 
Michigan law would likely lead to results similar to those in California 
and differs from Italian law in similar ways.  Michigan law includes different 
degrees of sexual contact that includes fourth degree sexual conduct, which 
is a misdemeanor.  This can be established by “sexual contact” achieved 
through force or coercion.181  Force or coercion may be established “[w]hen 
the actor achieves the sexual contact through concealment or by the element 
of surprise.”182  This would appear to cover some of the examples described 
above based on the sudden and unexpected nature of many of the kisses 
found to be “sexual acts” under Italian law.  However, Michigan law defines 
the term “sexual contact” to “include the intentional touching of the victim’s 
. . .  intimate parts.”183  The term “intimate parts,” “includes the primary gen-
ital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being.”184  Thus, 
like California, under Michigan law, a sudden, forced kiss on the victim’s 
mouth, cheek, or neck would not establish this lesser, misdemeanor offense.  
Further, Michigan law requires “that the intentional touching can reasonably 
be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done 
for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner for: (i) revenge. (ii) to inflict 
humiliation. (iii) out of anger.”185  This is similar to how California law re-
quires evidence that the offender had the purpose of “sexual arousal, sexual 
gratification, or sexual abuse.”186 
The American Law Institute has not yet approved187 the Model Penal 
Code provision “criminal sexual contact”188 and the definition of the term 
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“sexual contact.”189  However, the definition of sexual contact seems much 
broader than the California and Michigan laws reviewed above, to include 
“any touching of any body part of another person, whether clothed or un-
clothed, by any body part, body fluid, or object.”190 The offense of criminal 
sexual contact is simply sexual contact without consent.191  Sexual contact in 
this context would appear to permit convictions for situations similar to those 
described above upheld by the Italian Supreme Court.  However, the defini-
tion of the term sexual contact includes the requirement that the touching be 
“for the purpose of sexual gratification, sexual humiliation, sexual degrada-
tion, or sexual arousal.”192 
The objections raised by Caddopi, Vitiello, and other commentators to 
how the Italian Supreme Court has approached sudden, forced, and un-
wanted kisses, do not address the impact on the victim, other than to assert 
that this can be better addressed through the offense of battery.  Indeed, the 
assertion that these are trivial situations involving bumbling passes, com-
pletely discounts the impact on the victims.  Where, as in the U.S., there is 
the potential for draconian sentences for sexual crimes, as well as the non-
criminal consequences of having to register as a sex offender, attention 
should be devoted to changing these laws.  To argue that the current conse-
quences for sex crime convictions are too severe, and therefore, the criminal 
law should not address sudden, unwanted kisses, does a disservice to the 
victims.  In addition, the logical response is to focus on making the criminal 
consequences more rational and working to rid the criminal justice system 
of explicit and implicit bias. 
In light of what the #MeToo movement has revealed about sexual mis-
conduct and sexual violence, the approach of the Italian Supreme Court is 
much more protective of sexual autonomy and liberty than states like Cali-
fornia and Michigan.  The descriptions in the next section illustrate that these 
incidents are not rare, trivial, or ambiguous.  Instead the volume of #MeToo 
reporting highlights patterns of behavior by many men as well as significant 
harm to the victims.  
V. #METOO, SUDDEN KISSES, AND SEXUAL AUTONOMY 
Incidents of sudden, unwanted kisses have been among the many re-
ports of sexual misconduct since the #MeToo movement gained momentum.  
These incidents have ranged from conduct involving politicians, internship 
supervisors, and coworkers across multiple industries.193  Upon the one year 
anniversary of #MeToo, one source calculated that between 429 to 800 
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people, mostly men, had been accused of sexual misconduct.194  The miscon-
duct alleged ranges from inappropriate comments, sudden, unwanted kisses 
and hugs, to rape.195  This section describes some incidents to demonstrate 
the impact on the victims and to counter the assertion and assumption that 
such occurrences are rare and trivial enough to merit no consideration that 
they amount to sexual violence.  In addition, these accounts reveal patterns 
of behavior by some powerful men that often begin with sudden, forced, and 
unwanted kisses. 
One case involving a Canadian politician, David Laxton resulted in sex-
ual assault charges.196  The accuser had known Laxton when she was a server 
at a restaurant Laxton frequented.197  She later saw him at a grocery store 
where she was working.198  After she told him that she was looking for other 
employment, he offered to assist.199  She then met him in his office at the 
Yukon government building where Laxton’s administrative director helped 
her with her resume and reviewed some job openings.200  After the adminis-
trative director left, Laxton hugged the accuser and kissed her on her 
mouth.201  Upon escorting her out, Laxton hugged her and kissed her again 
on her mouth.  The accuser stated that she “froze.  [She] didn’t go there to 
be touched.  [She] didn’t go there to be kissed.”202  When the accuser reported 
this incident two months later, Laxton resigned his position as speaker of the 
Yukon legislature.203  At a two-day trial, Laxton testified that he had kissed 
and hugged the accuser before.204  The judge concluded that the hugs and 
kisses were “brief and were not accompanied by any other touching that 
might more conclusively point to a sexual purpose.”205  Like the element in 
the California law, this Canadian judge required evidence of the defendant’s 
sexual purpose.  The court also rejected the lesser charge of common assault, 
finding that Laxton “honestly but mistakenly believed he had consent.”206  
While the Italian cases described above are not directly on point, it is 
likely that an Italian court would consider the circumstances of this occurring 
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in a government office and the fact that the accuser was there seeking em-
ployment assistance, even if the two had previously kissed and hugged.  On 
the other hand, in the case of the doctor, R., the Court devoted analysis to the 
fact that the doctor and the victim had only ever greeted each other by saying 
good morning and good evening.207  Nonetheless, the Canadian court did not 
consider the impact on the sexual autonomy of the accuser, and the Corte di 
Cassazione opinions interpreting the 1996 law lead me to conclude that the 
Italian Court would have given greater consideration to the defendant’s in-
trusion on the accuser’s sexual autonomy. 
Another example provides additional information about the harm that 
this type of conduct causes.  An anonymous unpaid intern described an inci-
dent with a male superior at the company.208  They had been at a professional 
networking event and subsequently went out to eat with a few other peo-
ple.209  When the intern excused herself to use the restroom, the “higher up” 
followed her into the one-person bathroom and told her that he checks her 
out at the office and can’t stop thinking about her.210  He then leaned toward 
her and tried to kiss her.  She pushed him away and went outside.211  She 
rejoined the group for dinner.212  She explained that she was worried for her 
future career prospects at this company or at other companies if she com-
plained.213  She described how “her skin crawled” when she had to interact 
with him at the office.214 
Multiple women have described encounters with former CBS execu-
tive, Leslie Moonves, that involved sudden, forced, and unwanted kisses.215  
A female doctor who once treated Les Moonves described how, in an exam-
ining room, he grabbed her and tried to kiss her twice.216  Dr. Peters ex-
plained in a subsequent article, in which she did not name Mr. Moonves, that 
she had agreed to an early morning appointment to accommodate his 
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schedule.217  Initially, they reviewed his medical history and discussed his 
current health issue while they were seated at a small table.218  They then 
moved to the examination table, where  Dr. Peters described that “[Mr. 
Moonves] grabbed me as I stepped forward.  He pulled himself against me 
and tried to force himself on me.  He did this twice; when I rebuffed him, he 
stood beside the examination table and satisfied himself . . . and left.”219  Mr. 
Moonves disputed how Dr. Peters characterized this incident but admitted 
that he did try to kiss a doctor.220  Dr. Peters described her reaction, “I felt 
ashamed,” she wrote.221  “I hadn’t screamed—I was supposed to be offering 
‘extra-special’ service to this man because he was rich and powerful and 
good for my institution.”222 
There are at least seven other reported incidents involving Les Moonves 
and sudden, forced kisses.223 Illeana Douglas described an incident when she 
and Mr. Moonves were reviewing a script for the show “Queen,” when he 
suddenly asked her if she was single.224  She replied, “[y]es, no, maybe” and 
attempted to turn the conversation back to the script.225  Moonves interrupted 
her, asking to kiss her.226  Douglas again attempted to focus on the script.227  
She described that “[i]n a millisecond, he’s got one arm over me, pinning me 
. . . and was violently kissing [me],” holding her down on the couch with her 
arms above her head.228 She described feeling paralyzed and “like a trapped 
animal.”229  He began to push up her skirt and then paused asking her, “So, 
what do you think?”230  She explained that she thought she would joke her 
way out of the situation just to get away.231  When he got up, she began to 
go toward the door.232  He blocked her way, backed her up against a wall and 
said, “[w]e’re going to keep this between me and you, right?”233  She agreed 
and was then able to leave.234 Douglas described the incident as “so invasive” 
and one that “has stayed with [her] the rest of [her] life.”235  As with the 
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incident with Dr. Peters, Moonves acknowledged trying to kiss Douglas but 
“denies any characterization of ‘sexual assault,’ intimidation, or retaliatory 
action.”236  Ronan Farrow described six additional incidents of Moonves 
forcing himself on women, violently kissing them.237  The similarities of 
these incidents indicate a disturbing pattern of a man in a position of author-
ity thrusting kisses on women.  Sometimes the women are able to leave, but 
the Farrow articles describe how, on a number of occasions, Moonves con-
tinued his sexually aggressive behavior.238  
Another example of a powerful man engaging in a pattern of behavior 
of thrusting sudden, forced kisses on women is President Donald Trump.  In 
addition to the incident described by Rachel Crooks, a woman who worked 
on President Trump’s campaign has filed a lawsuit alleging that President 
Trump attempted to kiss her on her mouth, but she turned her head and he 
kissed the side of her mouth.239  Alva Johnson stated that as President Trump 
was exiting an RV before a campaign rally in August of 2016, “he grabbed 
her hand and prepared to kiss her; she turned her head, so his lips hit the side 
of her mouth.”240  Ms. Johnson stated that it “was super creepy” and that she 
“felt violated immediately because [she] wasn’t expecting it or wanting 
it.”241  She stated that she “can still see his lips coming straight for her 
face.”242 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the U.S., we can learn a great deal from how the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione has interpreted the crime of “sexual violence” as it applies in the 
context of sudden, forced, and unwanted kisses.  The Italian Court has reaf-
firmed the goal, or bene giuridico, of protecting victims’ sexual autonomy 
and has chosen not to adopt a definition of “sexual acts” that is limited to 
anatomy, as do California and Michigan with their narrow definitions of 
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“intimate parts.” The Italian Court has dispensed with pre-1996 interpreta-
tions that focused on the offender’s specific intent of satisfying his sexual 
instincts to avoid a focus on society’s sexual mores.  Finally, the Italian Court 
has concluded that the circumstances surrounding a sudden, forced kiss can 
support the element of violence required by the law due to the victim’s ina-
bility to express the unwanted nature of such kisses. 
We might consider each of these aspects of Italian law in determining 
whether to make adjustments to sexual battery or sexual contact laws.  Mak-
ing adjustments to sexual battery and contact laws should occur simultane-
ously with rationalizing our criminal justice system with respect to moderat-
ing punishment, narrowing sex offender registration laws, and ridding the 
system of explicit and implicit bias.  The experiences of victims subjected to 
sudden, forced, and unwanted kisses, as well as the patterns displayed by 
men, illustrate that these instances are neither rare nor trivial.  Focusing on 
the goal of protecting sexual autonomy should guide these reforms as it has 
guided the Corte di Cassazione. 
 
